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Category Archives: Hydroelectric

IESO: Long-Term 2 RFP – August 20, 2026

Big Falls – Victory – stopped a proposed hydroelectric project on a sacred site!

MEM knows. Its own policy paper calls hydroelectricity non-dispatchable with limited to no flexibility, records the surplus it helps create and the exports sold at or below zero, and concedes that new hydroelectric generation needs longer lead times and long-term certainty than other resources.15 The policy framework actually driving this procurement is worse. The Ministry’s June 2025 Energy for Generations makes no mention of climate change at all.31  ORA said so in its filed feedback of 12 March 2026, and says it again: an electricity plan that does not read the province’s own climate science is not planning.5 Ontario’s own Climate Change Impact Assessment, published by another ministry of the same government, rates electrical power generation infrastructure in the highest-risk category for all future time periods, and names increasing temperatures and reduced hydroelectric output as a consequence of drought.12

That assessment was not a report to one ministry. It came with a commitment from the government as a whole. The then Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (MECP) wrote, in his message launching it, that “climate change requires a whole-of-government approach, and as we build Ontario, it is vital we do so in a way that will protect the well-being of current and future generations, safeguard the natural environment, ensure food and water security, enhance infrastructure and strengthen our economy.”32 Safeguard the natural environment. Ensure water security. Strengthen the economy. All three in one sentence, from this government, about this assessment.

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ERO 026-0329: Technical Guide, River and Stream Systems: Flooding Hazard Limit, and Technical Bulletin, Special Flooding Hazard Conditions in River and Stream Systems

24 June, 2017 – An extreme rain event caused the dam to fail when all the stop logs could not be removed.

ORA has reviewed both draft documents. We are strongly opposed to this proposal and we ask the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) to withdraw it.1 The hydrology and hydraulics chapters of the Technical Guide are a real improvement on the 2002 edition and should be retained and completed; however, the Technical Bulletin should not proceed in its current form. It reverses a provincial policy that exists to keep people and communities out of harm’s way, it does so in a document that no one is required to follow, and it does so without a single word about the environment, about Indigenous communities, or about who pays when a dam or water retainment structure fails.

This is a public safety matter. Loss of life and loss of property are what is at stake, and this proposal goes against the public interest.

ORA has made it clear that we are strongly opposed to this proposal and that it should be withdrawn. In the event MNR moves forward regardless, the recommendations below are offered as a fail-safe to mitigate the Ministry’s mitigation efforts. None of them should be read as support for the proposal.

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UNFCCC: Call for Input Comments for Article 6.4-MEP 014-A03

Comment 9: Installed capacity is not an adequate basis for hydropower eligibility.

Section no. (as in the document): Cover note, section 3.1 (applicability to scales of activity); and 4. Applicability

Paragraph / Table / Figure no.: Paragraph 8(b) (options B1.1, B1.2, B2); and paragraph 17

Comment (including justification for change): The proposed options assess hydropower applicability primarily using installed capacity thresholds, such as 15 MW or 50 MW. Installed capacity is not an adequate basis for deciding whether a hydropower activity should be eligible. Most hydro facilities reach their rated capacity only during the freshet, a high-flow period that typically lasts eight to ten weeks, and generate well below capacity for the rest of the year. A small run-of-river may generate only 15 to 30 percent of installed capacity (North of Dryden Integrated Regional Resource Plan, 2015, Ontario Power Authority and IESO). In fact, during the hottest days of the summer when air conditioners are humming, these run-of-river dams often have to shut down completely because there is not enough flow to turn the turbines. Consequently, a capacity figure says little about actual generation, operating mode, or emissions.

A capacity threshold also produces a perverse outcome. Small facilities greatly outnumber large ones: of the 224 waterpower facilities the Ontario Waterpower Association records in Ontario, 28 percent are under 1 MW and a further 38 percent are 1 to 10 MW, so 66 percent are 10 MW or smaller, the largest share of the fleet. Meeting a given generation target through many small dams, therefore, harms many more rivers than a single larger facility on a larger river, which has more water to moderate its impacts. ORA’s own experience bears this out: 34 proposed waterpower facilities, all under 10 MW, often in a cascading series of facilities to increase output, on 19 Ontario rivers represented roughly 115 MW of installed capacity but only about 57 MW of net output, since proponents themselves plan for about 50 percent net capacity. That is many fragmented rivers for very little actual power (Ontario Rivers Alliance, Hydro Impacts 101: The Trade-offs, page 32). That net output is also likely to decline further over the dam’s operating life, as climate change reduces and shifts river flows through drought, reduced snowpack and earlier runoff, so a capacity figure overstates both current and future generation (Canada’s Changing Climate Report, 2019). Eligibility should be based on storage, drawdown, operating mode, and measured emissions, not on installed capacity.

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IESO: Long Lead-Time RFP: Questions and Comments

The hydro-only energy stream is not reconciled with the IESO’s own August 2025 modelling.

The LLT energy stream is restricted to new hydroelectric resources, yet the IESO’s own August 2025 Hybrid Resource Portfolio Equivalency Assessment found that wind/solar/BESS portfolios served 99.5%–99.98% of the peaky-need scenario and 99.7%–99.9% of the baseload-need scenario, and that a gas + wind/solar/BESS portfolio served 100% of load at a lower net present value than the gas-only option in seven of ten weather years. The IESO has not publicly reconciled that modelling with a decision to create an exclusive 40-year procurement lane for new hydro, together with the new transmission required to connect those projects to the grid. Citing the Directive does not discharge the IESO’s public-interest obligation to show that new hydro is necessary, least-cost and superior to lower-risk alternatives.

Nor has the IESO published any comparable analysis testing new hydro against wind, solar and BESS portfolios; the reconciliation gap is therefore wider, not narrower.

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IESO: Long-Term 2 RFP – June 16, 2026

ORA’s central concern is that LT2 is being used, alongside the LLT RFP and roughly 1,800 kilometres of “priority” transmission, to advance ratepayer-backed repowered and new hydropower generation as quickly as possible, without a consolidated accounting of what it will cost ratepayers, in dollars and in emissions. Cost, emissions, public health impacts, fuel price exposure, and stranded asset risk are not external to affordability and reliability; they are a huge part of it. Environmental Defence made the same point in this engagement, cautioning that procurement frameworks “should not treat these externalities as irrelevant to affordability or reliability.” ORA agrees. The IESO’s own Hybrid Resource Portfolio Equivalency Assessment found that a portfolio of wind, solar and battery energy storage systems (BESS) can meet system needs “with 99.50 to 99.98 percent of load served” in every weather year modelled, and “can provide both baseload and peak power.” Wind, solar and BESS are cheaper, cleaner and faster to deploy than hydroelectricity, and far cleaner than gas.


IESO: Regional Electricity Planning in the Northwest Region – June 11, 2026

The IRRP is the planning vehicle that is meant to consider a broad range of options, including non-wires alternatives. ORA asks the IESO to hold to that purpose in the Northwest. Several large transmission builds are already underway or contemplated for the region: the $1.2 billion dollar Waasigan line, in service between 2026 and 2027,2 the Red Lake line north of Dryden, a 230 kV double-circuit build that nearly quadruples the area’s capacity, roughly 400 MW, and is expected in the early 2030s, a planned 230 kV line toward the Greenstone area, and the recently completed East-West Tie at about $777 million. The IESO has not published a cost estimate for the Red Lake line, though it almost certainly holds one; CBC reports it at $830 million. For scale, the province’s new Barrie-to-Sudbury bulk line is estimated at $1.4 to $1.6 billion. These are multi-billion-dollar commitments. A wind, solar, and battery storage package sized to a remote community’s need costs a fraction of a long transmission build and can be deployed far sooner, so communities are not left waiting years for power that a local resource could deliver.

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IESO: Regional Electricity Planning in the Northwest Region – June 11, 2026

The Chute, First Falls, Ivanhoe River – Photo by Mark Clement

During the June 11 webinar, ORA asked why wind, solar, and battery energy storage systems (BESS) could not supply some remote communities directly, rather than waiting on long transmission builds, when those resources are cheaper, cleaner, and faster to deploy. The IESO answered that this is “exactly the kind of options and considerations this planning process is meant to consider,” and confirmed that such supply resources “can certainly be done in a shorter timeframe” and “are a key aspect to helping address some of those more near-term needs” for remote communities.1 ORA welcomes that answer and writes to ensure it is carried into the demand forecast, the scenarios, and the plan that follows.

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IESO: Changes to the Establishment and Publication of Market Parameters – June 18, 2026

ORA’s concern is heightened by the growing influence of directives from the Minister of Energy and Mines over IESO preferences that are backed by data or studies. The April 16, 2026, Ministerial Directive instructed the IESO to procure new long lead-time hydroelectric generation, even as the Directive acknowledged that these resources are “deemed not well-suited to competing against resources with shorter development timelines and lifespans (e.g., wind, solar and inverter-based battery energy storage systems).” That instruction overrode the IESO’s own August 2025 Hybrid Resource Equivalency Assessment, which found that wind, solar, and battery energy storage systems (BESS) could serve 99.5 to 99.98 percent of load in the Peaky Need Scenario. When political direction can displace the IESO’s own expert analysis, on-the-record, Board-governed control of market parameters is not a formality. It is the safeguard that keeps ratepayer-facing decisions independent, accountable, and aligned with the public interest rather than a shifting political agenda.

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Federal: Getting Major Projects Built in Canada: Discussion Paper on Regulatory Reform

Abitibi River – Twin Falls GS

The Discussion Paper frames delays as a process problem caused by excessive oversight and public consultation considerations that delay projects by more than five years before federal decisions are made and construction begins. The evidence from ORA’s direct experience tells a different story: current delays are driven primarily by proponents who extend their own timelines while development activity proceeds on the ground, and by assessments that defer rather than decide on the most difficult questions. Reducing or eliminating public consultation will not fix these structural failures. It will make them worse, and the costs will be borne by communities, by First Nations, and ultimately by the federal government in litigation.

ORA supports a well-resourced, efficient, and credible impact assessment system, and supports reforms that fix the real bottlenecks: underfunded review staff, incomplete Crown consultation, and weak post-approval enforcement. ORA opposes the proposals that would cut public and Indigenous participation, exempt whole categories of projects from independent review, or allow construction to begin before a decision is made.

The Prime Minister promised, in the 2025 Speech from the Throne, that decisions on major projects would be made within two years. The Discussion Paper now proposes one. ORA asks the Government to hold the Prime Minister to that two-year commitment, and to withdraw the following proposals outright: early construction before a decision (Proposal 6.5); the Cabinet power to exempt projects from the species-at-risk jeopardy test (Proposal 6.8); Federal Economic Zones (Proposal 5); the removal of independent impact assessment for pipelines and transmission lines (Proposal 4); the transfer of nuclear and uranium assessments to the industry’s own regulator (Proposal 4); and the new ministerial powers to weaken environmental conditions after approval (Proposals 6.6 and 6.7).

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IESO: North of Sudbury Bulk Planning Update

The IESO’s own planning documents are the appropriate starting point. The May 20, 2026, presentation states on slide 24: “A large share of supply resources in the area is hydroelectric, which is energy-limited and cannot be relied on at full output in all hours.”1 Slide 30 states: “Hydroelectric supply resources are energy-limited and cannot be relied on to meet demand in all hours or conditions.” The planning engineer presenting the NOS plan confirmed verbally at the May 20 webinar that “These hydro facilities are largely river-based, so they have limited storage, meaning their output depends on water availability, so they cannot be relied on at all times.”

Against that backdrop, the Province’s April 9, 2025, media release describes the proposed Nine Mile Rapids and Grand Rapids generating stations, together up to 430 MW, as providing “affordable, reliable, and clean electricity” and “24/7 power for families and businesses,” and characterizes hydroelectricity as “a reliable source of emissions-free power.” ORA places both sets of statements on the formal planning and procurement record. The contradiction between what the IESO’s own planning staff have documented and what the Province and industry have announced to the public is not a minor discrepancy. It goes to the core of whether the plan’s generation assumptions are honest and forthright, and whether the long-term ratepayer commitments contemplated here rest on an accurate foundation.

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